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Abstract: 
Despite theoretical advances in analyses on smallholder participation, little attention is paid to the marketing of staple 
food grains and the role of upstream segment. In this study, we argue that participation does not depend only on a 
well-functioning output market, but also on efficient and low-costs production factors. In this context, transaction 
costs in output market are part of total costs including those in factors markets. Therefore, the decision whether to 
participate or not in output market, is based on the effective margin associated to participation. Using survey data 
from the cereal sub-sector in Guinea, results indicate that market price of food grains must sufficiently overweight 
unit production costs to motivate smallholders to be market-oriented, otherwise they would prefer to meet their own 
consumption needs. Access to transportation equipment, adoption of technology and adherence to farmers’ 
organizations are determinant when promoting market participation. 
 Introduction 
The transformation of agriculture through switching from low productivity (semi-subsistence 
agriculture) to high productivity (market-oriented agriculture) formed a major topic of 
development and agricultural economics for many years (Barrett 2008). The argument is that 
the shift of semi-subsistence agriculture toward market orientation2 can significantly boost the 
income and increase the welfare of smallholder farmers as well as contribute to economic 
growth and poverty alleviation. (Zhou & al., 2013) 
However, in Sub-Saharan Africa, semi-subsistence agriculture remains high; around 90% of 
the agricultural output is produced by semi-subsistence farming (Torero, 2011)3; revealing that 
most of African smallholders produce more staple food grains to meet firstly their own 
consumption and then put the rest on markets. In the literature, factors limiting smallholder 
market participation have been discussed for a long time, but there are still some gaps that 
justify further researches to hone understanding about smallholders’ motivation to be market-
oriented. In a coherent theoretical framework, the pioneer work by Goetz (1992) has pointed 
out that  transaction costs such as transportation costs, search costs associated with access to 
market, and smallholders assets4endowment, are factors influencing market participation. 
Recent empirical studies (Azam & al. 2012; Martey & al. 2012; Mmbando & al. 2015) supported 
Goetz’s findings in different contexts5. However, Jaleta & al. (2009) brought attention to the 
fact that smallholder market participation requires not only perfect output markets but also 
efficient and low-cost factor markets that can capture the true opportunity costs of inputs. In 
this vein, Winter-Nelson & Temu (2005), by studying input markets, have shown that 
constraints6 linked to access to fertilizer markets may raise transaction costs that can differ 
from those prevailing in output markets; what may jeopardize intensification process and 
mitigate marketed supply. Based on that result, Alene & al. (2008) mentioned that Goetz (1992) 
and a few previous studies (Key & al.,2000; Vakis & al.,2003) have overlooked the role of 
market production shifters – fertilizers for example – in generating marketable surplus when 
analyzing market participation of smallholders.  
                                                          
2 As mentioned by Jaleta et al. (2009), market participation does not focus only on cash crop production but also includes 
production and marketing of staple food. The reason is that in some circumstances, imperfections in markets can prevent a full 
specialization in cash crop. 
3 Cited by Aragie & McDonald (2014). 
4 Such as land, machinery and transport equipment.  
5 Goetz (1992) for Senegal, Azam and al (2012) for Cambodia, Mmbando and al (2015) for Tanzania. This is a non-exhaustive 
list of studies based on seminal work by Goetz (1992). 
6 In the Tanzanian context, authors found that constraints related to access to fertilizer markets located in towns, while farmers 
are in remote villages, imply different travel costs for inputs and outputs (Winter-Nelson and Temu, 2005). 
 In addition to production shifters markets like fertilizers, and improved seeds, transaction costs 
may appear in rural labor markets that can raise labor costs at farms level, and then mitigate 
production of marketable surplus. In fact, recent literature on developing countries has pointed 
out that large proportion of agricultural households hire external labor7 even when they rely 
heavily on unpaid family labor and suffer from imperfections in rural labor market (Dillon & 
Barrett 2014; Bedemo & al., 2013; Kaur 2012). Furthermore, within developing countries, one 
of the features of rural labor markets is the lack of institutional framework which permits the 
establishment of formal enforceable contracts based on information on both smallholders and 
workers. Theoretically, the lack of information on workers may create two problems: (i) the 
productivity of diverse workers is not observable with certainty (adverse selection), (ii) work 
effort is not completely observable, verifiable (moral hazard), (DeSilva, & al., 2006). In terms 
of implications, adverse selection leads to recruiting costs (search, screening) while moral 
hazard can lead to monitoring costs (supervision) or to paying efficiency wages to guarantee 
great efficiency at work. For example, Kaur (2012) explained empirically a downward nominal 
wage rigidity in agricultural labor market by pointing out the presence of efficiency wages; and 
(DeSilva, & al., 2006) showed the existence of supervision costs measured by opportunity costs 
of time of family members in charge of monitoring hired labor at work. 
In this research, we analyze the participation of smallholders in staple food grains market in 
Guinea Republic while stressing on the role of factor markets. Unlike previous studies, we 
argue that market participation does not rely only on well-functioning output market 
(downstream), but also on low-costs production factors8 (upstream). Indeed, in some 
circumstances, smallholders may get access to purchased inputs like fertilizers, seeds or other 
chemicals and hired labor at higher costs due to transaction costs9. In this context, transaction 
costs in output market are part of total costs including those in factor markets. Therefore, the 
decision (ex-ante) whether to participate or not in output market, is based on the expected 
effective gain10 associated to participation. More specifically, the rational behavior is that 
market price of food grains must sufficiently overweight unit production costs to motivate 
smallholders to be market-oriented, otherwise they would prefer to meet their own 
                                                          
7 Agricultural households’ demand for external labor may be motivated by the lack of family labor supply during a peak season 
(Kaur 2012) or during production stages requiring labor intensively such as weeding or plant preparation (Parker & al., , 
2009)Recently, Dillon & Barrett (2014)  showed that in Niger, Malawi and Uganda, more than 40% of farm households hire 
labor. 
8 (Jaleta & al., 2009) 
9 In some other cases, they cannot get access to input market because of higher transaction costs or missing markets. 
10 Spread between market price of food grains and unit-production costs. 
 consumption11 needs. In other words, if the food market is unfavorable or if there is food 
shortage, farmers can sell or consume their own production. (Handschuch et al. 2015). This 
hypothesis is plausible and relevant to be tested since stylized facts revealed that in Guinea, (i) 
local input market (fertilizers, improved seeds and other chemical products) is very tight and 
when producers get access to inputs they incur transactions costs due to transportation costs 
and isolation of production zones12;.. (USAID, 2006, 2015) 
Although the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) crisis13 (started in 2013 and ended in 2015) raised 
constraints in farming activities through reducing labor force14 and raising costs to reach 
markets, the agricultural sector, and particularly the cereal subsector in Guinea faces 
longstanding constraints that limit productivity and prevent farmers from benefiting from 
market opportunities offered by the growing population –urbanization. In fact, agriculture in 
Guinea is dominated by small farmers using traditional systems (low mechanization, low use 
of fertilizers and improved seeds) based essentially on rainfall. 
About 80% of the labor force is in agriculture15 while the sector is estimated to produce 12% 
of GDP. Agricultural production is broadly driven by cereals- a production of 3.3 million tons 
over 2.8 million hectares. The cereal sub-sector is mainly led by rice and maize productions 
that represent respectively 58.1% and 20.4% of cereal production and 57.8% and 18.9% of land 
affected to cereal crops16. Recent literature on value chains in the main cereal-producing 
regions, revealed that about 84% of rice farmers reported using no fertilizer and 69% do not 
apply crop protection inputs; only 0.2% use improved seeds. On the other hand, only 2% of 
maize farmers reported using fertilizer. Almost all harvesting and threshing is done manually, 
which requires more labor. (USAID, 2015) 
Aware of such situation, the government is striving to promote the development of cereals 
value chains with focus on rice, through implementing programs and projects that emphasize 
the enhancement of the productivity of farms and the commercialization of agricultural 
commodities.  
                                                          
11 Cereals (particularly rice) are important in consumption habits in Guinea. It’s also been revealed that Guinean consumers 
prefer and are willing to pay a price premium for domestically produced rice. (USAID, 2015).  
12 In general, inputs are imported from foreign countries by private firms (individual or societies), projects or government in 
collaboration with development partners; and most of input sales outlets are based in Conakry and other urban areas away 
from production zones where the quality of roads is bad. Another explanation of higher costs of inputs in Guinea is linked to 
fluctuation and continuing depreciation of the local currency. (USAID, 2006) 
13 . In the short term, the Ebola crisis In Guinea leads to 12,000 jobs lost in the transport sector and over 40,000 jobs in the 
potato sector (USAID, 2015).  
14 According to the WHO (December, 2015), in Guinea 2,536 deaths have been recorded and 3,804 have been declared.: 
http://apps.who.int/ebola/current-situation/ebola-situation-report-23-december-2015 
15 Agriculture only includes crop culture and hunting activities.  
16 Annual statistics reported by National office for statistics in 2013 and 2014: http://www.stat-
guinee.org/index.php/documents-publies/annuaire-stat 
 In this context, an empirical investigation on better understanding of participation of 
smallholders in food grains markets would be useful to design strategies enhancing the 
development of economically important value chains and would be also a notable contribution 
to literature.  
The paper is organized as follows: section 1 overviews the literature on market participation 
analysis, section 2 presents the theoretical model, empirical specification and data, and section 
3 presents results and concluding remarks. 
  
 Literature review 
For many years, analyses on smallholders’ market participation have drawn researchers’ 
attention both in developed and developing countries. The literature on this topic is shifting 
from analyses that focus on transaction costs in output markets toward those including 
transactions costs both in input and output markets. But there are still gaps that justify further 
researches to hone understanding about smallholder motivation to be market-oriented.  
From the pioneer work by Goetz (1992) till recent years, literature on this topic has highlighted 
the role of transaction costs in the choice of market regimes (net sellers, net buyers or autarky). 
Two large categories of transactions costs were highlighted (Vakis & al.,2003; Key & 
al.,2000): proportional (PTC) and fixed transaction costs (FTC). Proportional transaction costs 
depend on transacted volume. They include transportation costs and time spent to deliver 
output to the market. Thus, they reduce price effectively received when selling output. On the 
other hand, fixed transaction costs are invariant to the volume of the transaction. They include 
information, negotiation and monitoring costs. Information costs are related to aspects such as 
searching for potential buyers and/or better price. Negotiation costs rely on time spent to 
bargain output price or wage, reach an agreement and decide for payment. Monitoring costs 
arise to enforce conditions of contract or exchange.  
Goetz (1992) constructed a switching model to analyze Senegalese smallholder participation 
in coarse grain market. The rationale behind his analysis is that smallholders face two 
decisions. Firstly, they must decide whether to participate17 or not and, secondly, they must 
determine quantities to be sold or bought18. The hypothesis is that factors influencing sales are 
the same that affect the decision of whether to participate or not, but the opposite is not true 
since the second stage of decision can only be affected by proportional transaction costs. In 
other words, determinants of sales are a sub-set of those affecting participation decision. 
Empirically, Goetz used a probit model to identify determinants of market participation and he 
estimated supply and demand functions using OLS regression, conditional on regimes of 
market participation. As main results, he showed that better market information has positive 
and significant effect on the probability of being a seller, and the access to technology increases 
sales. 
                                                          
17 As seller, buyer or autarkic. 
18 Intensity of participation. 
 Following Goetz (1992), Key & al.(2000) developed a structural model where producers can 
be net sellers, net buyers, or prefer to stay out of market (autarky). The choice of regimes of 
market participation is based on comparison of expected utilities in each regime. The 
innovation brought by authors is about separating effects of proportional transaction costs from 
those of fixed transaction costs when estimating a structural model. Using data from the corn 
sector in Mexico19, estimation results indicated that transaction costs are determinants of 
smallholders’ participation.  
Using the same theoretical framework as Goetz (1992) but extended by Key & al.(2000), Ouma 
& al. (2010) investigated determinants of smallholder’s participation20 in the banana market 
both in Rwanda and Burundi. The methodology is based on a two-step procedure by Heckman 
(1979). Findings showed that market participation decision and sales are influenced negatively 
by transaction costs associated with transportation and market information costs. The price 
seemed to provide a significant incentive to supply banana in these areas. 
Olwande & al. (2015) aimed at (i) understanding drivers of smallholders’ entry in maize, kale 
and milk markets and (ii) analyzing and comparing factors influencing sales by commodities. 
The theoretical model is inspired by that from Key and al.(2000) but updated within the context 
of Southern Africa by Barrett (2008). The core framework describes an agricultural household 
relying on its own production and purchased goods, and maximizing utility function under 
income constraint coming from sales and off-farm activities. Using the Double Hurdle Model 
(DHM) by Cragg (1971) without overlooking unobserved heterogeneity, the authors found that 
household’s physical resource endowments21 and reliable rainfall are determinants of 
smallholders’ participation in maize, kale and milk markets in Kenya.  
Burke & al. (2015) proposed an innovative approach in modelling market participation 
decision. The rationale behind their method is that traditional Double Hurdle Models (DHM) 
based on a two-stage procedure and utilized in previous studies considers producers of a 
specific commodity. According to the authors, it would be relevant to know how policies 
enhancing market participation of producers of a specific commodity may encourage non-
producers to become producers and then sellers; yet the DHM overlooks such question. To fill 
this gap, Burke & al. (2015) introduced the Triple Hurdle Model (THM) where (i) the decision 
whether to produce or not is determined using a probit model, (ii) the decision to be net seller 
                                                          
19 Data collected in a national survey conducted in 1994 by the Mexican Ministry of Agrarian Reform. 
20 Here market participation includes decision to participate or not and sales conditional on participation. 
21 Land, transport and irrigation equipment, technology. 
 or net buyer or autarkic is determined through an ordered probit model and (iii) the volume of 
participation is a lognormal function. Applying their model to dairy market in Kenya, the 
authors found that rural electrification, training, and improved grazing practices enhance 
market participation of dairy producers.  
Martey & al. (2012) analyzed market participation and sales among maize and cassava farmers 
in Ghana. Unlike earlier studies, the authors analyze market participation empirically using 
Household Commercialization Index (HCI)22. Owing to the large number of zeros in sales data, 
a Tobit model has been applied to estimate sales equation. Results showed that transaction 
costs related to market access and extension services are key determinants of sales. 
Unlike studies presented above, there are authors that highlighted the role of transactions costs 
in input markets when analyzing participation of smallholders in output markets.  
Winter-Nelson & Temu (2005) argue that imperfections in fertilizer markets can limit the 
participation of smallholders in output market. The rationale behind their analysis is that in 
some contexts, transactions costs in fertilizer markets may raise and can even be higher than 
those in output markets; it results in low use of fertilizer, which mitigates the production of 
marketable surplus. Using data from Tanzanian coffee growers and estimating a sample 
selection model, results mainly indicated that output prices affect positively input purchases 
and that travel costs in input and output markets have distinct effects on input usage. 
In Kenya, Alene & al. (2008) studied smallholders’ participation in output and input (fertilizer) 
markets in maize sector. Following Key & al.(2000), the contribution of authors is about 
analyzing effects of transaction costs both on marketed supply and fertilizer use in the same 
theoretical framework. The argument is that constraints associated to access to production 
shifters such as fertilizer may jeopardize maize production and mitigate marketable surplus 
production. Using Heckman (1979) selection model, results indicated that transaction costs 
have negative effects on market participation and sales. High costs related to transportation or 
access to market information lead to low use of fertilizer and limited participation in maize 
market.  
However, these authors may overlook part of transactions costs in upstream segment as they 
focus mainly on fertilizer markets while transactions costs may exist in other factor markets 
(credit, labor for example), since the recent literature in developing countries highlights the 
                                                          
22 The index measures the extent to which household crop production is oriented toward the market. 
 recurrence of imperfections in those markets (Dillon & Barrett, 2014; Ali, & al., 2014; Kaur 
2012). 
Theoretical model and empirical specification 
Theoretical Model 
In this study, we start with an extension of the Goetz (1992) model by Alene & al. (2008). The 
theoretical model is a simple static agricultural household model that overlooks some aspects 
of household decision, particularly the role of risk and intra-annual credit constraints. However, 
we invoke non-separability23 hypothesis owing to the existence of multiple imperfections in 
markets.  
Let’s assume that the rational representative agricultural household produces one commodity. 
At the beginning of the agricultural season, it makes its plan (ex-ante) about production, sales, 
consumption and input purchases (fertilizer, labor, and other tradable factors) following market 
information (output price, wages, fertilizer price,). As both input and output markets suffer 
from imperfections, the prices in those markets include transactions costs24. Then, the objective 
of the household is to maximize a utility function (1) of net revenue under production 
technology constraint (2). 
 
Where 𝑝𝑞 is farmer’s specific output price; this price is (i) heterogeneous among smallholders 
and (ii) determined endogenously by observed market price (𝑝𝑚𝑞) and proportional 
transaction costs per unity of output (𝜑𝑞
𝑣) (Olwande & al. , 2015):     
𝑝𝑞 = 𝑝𝑚𝑞 − 𝜑𝑞
𝑣 
Let’s consider 𝜑𝑚𝑞
𝑓
 as fixed transaction costs at entry in output markets, 𝜑𝑚𝑓
𝑓
 is fixed 
transaction costs at entry in factor markets. 
𝑄 is the volume of output25, Xi is the volume of input and c is the unit input costs and may 
include transactions costs in input market, Li is the volume of hired labor, wi is the unit cost of 
                                                          
23 In the non-separable model, household production decisions are influenced by its consumption behavior (preferences, 
demographic characteristics…). In the opposite, a model is said to be separable when production decisions are completely 
independent from consumption decisions. The household first maximizes the profit and then uses generated profit as a 
component of income to set its demand for commodities. In this particular case, the model is said to be recursive. 
24 In output market, transactions costs such as travel costs diminish the price while in factor market they raise price paid by 
farmer. 
25 Or value of output 
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Following Goetz (1992) and Alene & al. (2008), the first order conditions of the maximization 
of the utility function under constraint (2) will yield reduced forms of the system of input 
demand (fertilizer, hired labor, other tradable factors) and output production and market supply. 
Usually, output supply and input demand are jointly estimated, Sadoulet & de Janvry (1995) 
have showed that it is possible to focus on output market participation in presence of transaction 
costs without dealing with all the system26. It results in the following of marketed supply27, 
conditional on participation in output market: 
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26 The distinguishing feature of agricultural household decision is that in presence of imperfections (transaction costs) in 
markets, production, sales, consumption and input purchases depend on household characteristics; therefore non-separability 
decisions can be tested if output supply is influenced by household characteristics, which also affects consumption decision, 
production decision. 
27 Here we derive participation and sales in output market as it is of interest. However, one may be interested in participation 
in both input and labor markets; if so, the same approach can be used. 
 Thus, market participation28 can be understood as discrete comparisons of expected utilities 
and it will be determined by (i) expected margin per unit of output and (ii) by household 
characteristics. 
Empirical specification  
In empirical literature review, two approaches are often used to estimate two-stage decision 
processes. Basically, the main difference between these methods is due to the treatment of zeros 
in data on sales for nontrivial fraction of smallholders. The first, Heckman (1979) selection 
model, is based on the assumption that zeros come from unobserved data due to non-random 
sample from survey, non-response in survey or sample attrition. The second, Double Hurdle 
model (DHM) (Cragg, 1971) considers zeros as observed data since they can reflect rational 
decisions of smallholders to stay out of the markets owing to multiple factors preventing access 
to market such as insufficient expected net gain from selling. Following our theoretical 
framework, we assume that the DHM is suited to analyze market participation of smallholders. 
Following Garcia (2013), in Hurdle model, the single mechanism that determines the choice 
whether to participate or not (y>0 Vs y=0) can be different from that influencing sales. This 
can be summarized in two steps as follows: 
Decision of participation: the smallholder decides to sell or not a positive quantity (Y*) 
*
*
* *
Y =    ;  Y = inobserved sales ; mg* =inobserved margin,  s =inobserved threshold 
 potential seller or not,  is not observed
1   if  Y >0 or (mg* >s) 
   (12) 
0   if  Y =0 or (mg* <=s)
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28 As we will focus on cereals that are produced by all producers, we do not analyze producers decision. 
 Where Z and X are vectors of explanatory variables affecting decision of participation and sales 
respectively; 𝑌𝑖is the observed quantity (or sales) sold by smallholder and is a dependent 
variable continuous over positive values. The model can be reduced as: 
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The log likelihood function for the DHM can be defined and the Maximum Likelihood 
Estimator (MLE) is used to estimate  ,   𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜎 where 𝜎=var(𝜖) and the restriction is that 
v𝑎𝑟(𝑢)=1 in order to allow the model to be identified. (See Garcia, 2013) 
Past empirical studies mentioned that measurement of transaction costs poses many difficulties 
owing to the fact that they include variables that are not easily observables in a survey (Key & 
al., 2000); Alene & al., 2008). However, Vakis & al. (2003) argued that their measurement can 
be approached using variables related to characteristics of market actors. In this study, we 
consider proxies of transaction costs such as distance to food market, ownership of transport 
equipment (motorcycle, bicycle, and car), ownership of communication assets -telephones -. 
(Alene & al. 2008) 
Distance to market is supposed to increase travelling time and transportation costs and then 
reduce market participation and sales. Ownership of transport equipment is assumed to enhance 
market participation at both levels since it helps owner gather information when selling; it also 
facilitates transportation of products from farms to markets. Access to communication assets 
(telephone) is expected to improve market participation by reducing search costs when seeking 
buyers. 
Other factors that are susceptible to influence market participation are, adherence to farmers’ 
organizations, off-farm income (including salary, income of breeding), composition of 
household (ratios of dependents, male and off-farm employees in households), adoption of 
technology in farming activities (utilization of fertilizers), percentage of hired labor in farm 
labor, share of cereals purchases in household consumption and agro-ecological characteristics.  
Finally, our main explanatory variable is the expected margin per unit of output that is supposed 
to influence positively the participation of smallholders in market. We expect that the higher 
this relative price is, the more smallholders are market-oriented. 
 Data 
The data used in this research come from the national household survey (ELEP29 2012) 
conducted by the “Institut National de la Statistique” in Guinea. The data had been collected 
between February and April 2012 and a two-stage stratified random sampling was used to get 
finally 3,996 urban households and 3,575 rural households. Information on households covered 
a set of domains including Education, Wealth, Poverty status, Housing, Employment, on-farm 
activities, income sources, etc…. In addition, the dataset includes prices collected at local levels 
(outlets). 
We focus our analysis on rural areas 30  since most of the agricultural activities are carried on 
in the rural context31. Constraints due to data structure32 impose to emphasize cereal33 
producers who represent about 96% of farmers. The survey also contains data on commodities 
market prices collected at village level (local markets).  
Table 1 presents statistics of sample. The absolute market price does not seem to be a 
motivating factor of being market-oriented while the expected margin per unit of output34 does. 
In fact, average observed market price that non-sellers face is higher than that of sellers, while 
the average expected margin per unit of output is higher for participants than for non-
participants. This difference result from disparities in factors costs (input costs35, labor costs) 
between groups. 
Non-sellers seem to have less transactions costs than sellers. Indeed, percentages of households 
owning transportation and communication equipment are higher among non-sellers  than in the 
group of sellers. The first group is closer (6.92 km) to the nearest food market than the second 
one (7.81 km).  
Furthermore, non-sellers have more off-farm workers in the household than sellers. In fact, the 
first group has relatively more off farm income and higher percentage of off-farm employees 
than the second one. The share of cereal purchase in household consumption is higher (14%) 
                                                          
29 Enquête Légère sur l’Evaluation de la Pauvreté 
30 After dropping missing data, we get a sample of 3,491 rural households. 
31 In the dataset, around 78% of farmers live in rural areas. 
32 In the dataset, the productions are available for groups of commodities such as cereals, tubers and roots, legumes, industrial 
culture and fruits and vegetables. Furthermore, data on inputs (labor, fertilizer, seeds, etc…) are not decomposed into activities. 
33 Here cereals include rice,maize, fonio, millet and sorghum; however, it must be noted that cereal producers also produce 
other crops such as fruits and vegetables, tubers and roots and some industrial cultures; as we will see later, for this group of 
farmers, cereal production represents more than half of total output. 
34 Price net of unit factors costs. 
35 As they are not participants, non-sellers can use off farm income coming from breeding or other paid work (in services,) 
by household members. 
 among non-sellers compared to that of the second group (12%). This may show the difference 
in the contribution of cereal consumption in household welfare between these two groups. 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics  
Variables Description of variables Non-Sellers Sellers All diff   
    mean mean mean     
Rprix_kg market price of cereals ('000 LC per kg) 6.47 6.42 6.44 -0.05 *** 
unitcost Input cost per unity of output ('000 LC per kg) 0.18 0.16 0.17 -0.02  
Va_outp Value added per unit of output ('000 LC per kg) 6.29 6.26 6.28 -0.03  
Lab_outp Labor costs per unit of output ('000 LC per kg) 0.69 0.46 0.58 -0.23  
Ginc_outp Gross margin per unit of output ('000 LC per kg) 5.60 5.80 5.69 0.19  
Pemp Share of off- farm workers in Household 0.06 0.04 0.05 -0.02 *** 
Pdepen Share of children (<=5 years) and the elderly (> 59 years) in Household 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.00  
Pmen Share of Men in household (>18 & <=59) 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.02 *** 
Dfert 1 if Household uses fertilizer, 0 otherwise 0.19 0.18 0.18 -0.01  
Dfarm 1 if Household is member of a farm organization, 0 otherwise 0.40 0.55 0.47 0.15 *** 
Prod_cer Production of Cereals (tons) 1.15 1.37 1.25 0.22 ** 
Inc_oth.ag Income from other agri. commodities sales (millions LC) 0.95 1.06 1.00 0.10  
Inc.off.farm Off-farm income (millions LC) 1.95 1.49 1.74 -0.45 ** 
Inc_Elev Income of breeding (millions LC) 0.28 0.23 0.26 -0.05  
Sup_cer Land allocated to food grains 2.20 2.16 2.19 -0.04  
Transp 1 if Household owns at least 1 transportation equipment 0.37 0.33 0.36 -0.04 ** 
Telep 1 if Household owns at least 1 mobile phone 0.35 0.30 0.32 -0.05 *** 
Phlab Share of hired labor in total labor employed in farming 0.27 0.40 0.33 0.13 *** 
Dist Distance from market (km) 6.92 7.81 7.34 0.89 *** 
Shar_cer.purch Share of cereals purchases in household consumption   0.14 0.12 0.13 -0.02 *** 
Boke 1 if household resides in the region of Boke 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.00  
Faranah 1 if household resides in the region of Faranah 0.06 0.17 0.11 0.10 *** 
Kankan 1 if household resides in the region of Kankan 0.20 0.06 0.14 -0.14 *** 
Kindia 1 if household resides in the region of Kindia 0.10 0.22 0.16 0.12 *** 
Labe 1 if household resides in the region of Labe 0.19 0.09 0.14 -0.10 *** 
Mamou 1 if household resides in the region of Mamou 0.14 0.07 0.11 -0.07 *** 
Nzerekore 1 if household resides in the region of Nzerekore 0.18 0.28 0.23 0.09 *** 
Observation   1,535 1,347 2,882     
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Results  
In this section, we present firstly results on participation analysis and then, secondly, margins 
effects are presented. 
 Participation and sales 
Estimation results of DHM using Maximum Likelihood Estimator (see Garcia, 2013) are 
presented in Table 1. Estimations have been made without overlooking potential heterogeneity 
issues. The model showed greater significance as illustrated by log likelihood value and lower 
Mean Absolute Errors (MAE). 
 Table 2 :Estimation results 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
As expected, the participation of smallholders in the market is positively determined by the 
margin. In fact, this result reveals that, under given conditions in cereal markets, the price must 
sufficiently overweight unit production costs to motivate smallholders to be market-oriented.  
  Participation Intensity 
Transp 1 if Household owns at least 1 
transportation equipment 
-0.0106 
(-0.17) 
0.291*** 
(3.53) 
Telep 1 if Household owns at least 1 mobile 
phone 
-0.0498 
(-0.73) 
 
Dist Distance to market (km) 0.376 
(1.22) 
0.000581 
(0.00) 
Dfert 1 if Household uses fertilizer, 0 otherwise 0.117 
(1.59) 
0.315*** 
(3.39) 
Pemp Off-farm workers Household (share) -0.742
** 
(-3.08) 
-0.276 
(-0.77) 
Pdepen  Children (<=5 years) and elderly 
persons (> 59) in Household (share) 
0.135 
(0.88) 
0.0929 
(0.44) 
Pmen Adult Men in household (>18 & <=59) 
(share) 
0.454* 
(2.14) 
0.302 
(1.01) 
Phl Share of hired labor in farming labor 0.326
* 
(2.38) 
0.352 
(1.96) 
Dfarm 1 if Household is member of a farmer 
organization, 0 otherwise 
0.0968 
(1.63) 
0.292*** 
(3.73) 
Ln.Inc_oth.ag Log of other agri. commodities sales (LC) 0.0332
*** 
(7.89) 
-0.000428 
(-0.06) 
Ln.Inc_Elev Log of income from livestock (LC) 0.00613 
(1.11) 
-0.0151* 
(-2.12) 
Ln.Inc_offFarm Log of off-farm income (LC) -0.00539 
(-1.29) 
0.00423 
(0.70) 
Ln.rval Log of margin  0.162
** 
(3.22) 
0.0958 
(1.37) 
Ln.rval_sq Square of Log of margin -0.00803
** 
(-3.23) 
-0.00538 
(-1.56) 
Shar_cer.purch Share of cereals purchases in household 
consumption   
-0.940*** 
(-4.28) 
-1.982*** 
(-5.63) 
Boke 1 if household resides in region Boke 0.638
*** 
(5.16) 
-0.0928 
(-0.45) 
Faranah 1 if household resides in region Faranah 1.110
*** 
(9.21) 
-0.137 
(-0.57) 
Kindia 1 if household resides in region Kindia 1.144
*** 
(9.90) 
-0.300 
(-1.23) 
Labe 1 if household resides in region Labe 0.338
** 
(2.84) 
-1.530*** 
(-6.93) 
Mamou 1 if household resides in region Mamou 0.343
** 
(2.73) 
-0.747*** 
(-3.79) 
Nzerekore 1 if household resides in region 
Nzerekore 
0.653*** 
(5.94) 
-0.252 
(-1.24) 
_cons   -1.084*** 
(-7.18) 
13.48*** 
(33.36) 
N Observations 2882  
Log of likelihood    -1311306.8 
MAE Mean of Absolute Error 0.42                               7.22 
    
 This result is interesting and supports the fact that if the market price of staple food is 
unfavorable, then smallholders would consume their own production. (Handschuch et al. 
2015).  
The socio-demographic characteristics of households also exert influence over the decision of 
participation of smallholders in the market. Results indicate that the higher the number of off-
farm workers in household, the lower the likelihood to sale; and the number of adult men (>18 
& <=59) in the household and the number of hired labor in farm labor affect positively the 
decision to be seller. Furthermore, access to off-farm income (livestock) increases the 
probability of being market oriented. In fact, off-farm income is an additional resource that can 
be used to purchase production shifters. 
Adoption of technology, adherence to farm organizations and access to transportation 
equipment influence positively sales, conditional on participation in market. In fact, the 
utilization of fertilizers (adoption of technology) enhances farm productivity leading to an 
increase to marketable surplus; furthermore, farmer organizations (i) generally focus on 
building marketing and negotiation skills of members, and (ii) they can also play the 
intermediation role to help members in meeting potential buyers;  
Smallholders with higher share of cereal purchase in household consumption are less likely to 
be cereal sellers and even if they participate in market, their sales are relatively less important.  
 Margin effects  
Estimations of margin effects36 are presented in the Table below. Results indicate that an 
increase of 1% in expected margin per unit of output increases the probability of being 
participant by 0.05 percentage points.  Conditional on participation, access to transportation 
equipment, access to production shifters like fertilizer, and adherence to farm organizations, 
increase sales by 29.1%, 31.4% and 29.2% respectively. 
Table: Estimation of margin effects and elasticity of sales 
  Participation Intensity 
  Coef Robust-SE Coef Robust-SE 
Transp -0.004 0.021 0.291*** 0.082 
Dfert 0.04 0.025 0.314*** 0.092 
Dfarm 0.03 0.020 0.292*** 0.078 
Ln.rval 0.05*** 0.017 0.152 0.069 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
                                                          
36 See Garcia (2013) for more details on margin effects in DHM. 
  
Conclusion 
Despite the theoretical advances in analyses on smallholder market participation, little attention 
is paid to the role of factor market. In this study, we argue that market participation does not 
depend only on well-functioning output market (downstream), but also on efficient and low-
costs production factors (upstream). In some circumstances, smallholders may get access to 
purchased inputs like fertilizers, improved seeds or other chemicals and hired labor with higher 
costs due to transaction costs. In this context, transaction costs in output markets are part of 
total costs including those in input markets. Therefore, the decision whether to participate or 
not in output market is partly based on the margin associated to participation. More specifically, 
the rational behavior is that market price of food grains must sufficiently overweight unit 
production costs to motivate smallholders to be market-oriented, otherwise they would prefer 
to meet their own consumption needs. Recent stylized facts in Guinea show that input markets 
(fertilizers, improved seeds) are tight and suffer from imperfections (transportation costs, low 
supply). Using Guinean national survey data, results indicate that participation of smallholders 
in cereal market is influenced by state of both output and input markets. More specifically, they 
showed that expected margin is one of the main determining factors influencing market 
participation positively. This in line with the view that if the price of staple food is unfavorable, 
then smallholders would consume their own production. Access to transportation equipment, 
adoption of technology and adherence to farmers’ organizations are also instruments to 
promote market participation by smallholders. 
As recommendations, this research like previous studies, supports policies enhancing 
transportation infrastructures in rural areas to reduce transaction costs and improve access to 
market. However, it supports also actions focusing on factor market (upstream) (i) that facilitate 
access to production shifters like fertilizer at lower costs; (ii) that organize (formalize) rural 
labor market through the establishment of an institutional framework which promotes the 
creation of formal enforceable contracts including wages based on workers’ productivity.
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